Picture this: it's Fourth of July weekend, America's 250th birthday. A patient walks into a Washington, D.C., emergency room. International traveler. Initially mild symptoms. Then, the standard medications stop working. Not because the diagnosis was wrong — but because the bacteria causing the infection have evolved past the drugs we have to fight them. A nurse mentions it to a friend who happens to be a reporter. Within hours, garbled TikTok videos are describing a mystery illness spreading from the National Aquarium to a restaurant in Old Town Alexandria.
That scenario isn't fiction. It was the opening of a tabletop exercise I participated in just last week. And the reason it lands so hard in the room is that everyone in it knows: this is not a hypothetical. It is a live possibility, on any given day, in any emergency room in America.
Antibiotic resistance isn't coming. It's here. And we are losing.
The invisible pandemic doesn't get an outbreak photo
Part of why this crisis generates so little political urgency is structural. A respiratory virus moving between people produces dramatic images: overwhelmed hospitals, refrigerated morgue trucks, panic buying. Antibiotic resistance produces none of that. It manifests as an elderly woman with a urinary tract infection who isn't responding to the usual pills. A cancer patient whose post-chemotherapy infection won't clear. A transplant recipient dying of a bloodstream infection that, twenty years ago, would have been a footnote.
Each case looks like an individual tragedy. In aggregate, it's a catastrophe.
Drug-resistant infections kill tens of thousands of Americans every year. Globally, bacterial AMR was directly responsible for 1.27 million deaths in 2019 alone, with another 4.95 million deaths associated with it. A 2024 Lancet study projects that figure rising to 1.91 million deaths annually by 2050, with 39 million people expected to die from drug-resistant infections between 2025 and 2050.
That is akin to a pandemic by any reasonable definition. We just haven't conceptualized it that way.
Resistance is natural. The crisis is not.
Antibiotic resistance doesn't require humans. It predates us by billions of years. Bacteria have been fighting each other with chemical weapons — and evolving defenses against those weapons — for as long as life has existed on Earth. Resistance genes have been found in underground cave-dwelling bacteria that have never once been exposed to human civilization. We didn't create the problem. We accelerated it to the point of crisis.
When Alexander Fleming noticed that mold was killing the bacteria in his Petri dish in 1928 — and when Howard Florey and Ernst Chain turned that observation into actual medicine a decade later — they had no idea they were also starting a clock. Every antibiotic that enters the human body exerts selective pressure on bacteria: the organisms that happen to have resistance mechanisms survive; the others don't.
Do that across billions of courses of antibiotics, billions of animals in agriculture, and decades of sloppy stewardship, and you predictably accelerate what was always going to happen eventually.
At first glance, antibiotic resistance can seem like an inevitable story of decline.
None of this means antibiotics were a failure. Quite the opposite. Resistance is the expected consequence of evolution acting on bacterial populations. The remarkable achievement was never that penicillin worked forever. The achievement was that human beings discovered penicillin in the first place. The same capacity for reason that uncovered the antibiotic era can build whatever comes next. The danger is not that bacteria adapt. The danger is that our institutions, incentives, and investments stop adapting faster than they do.
What makes this crisis acute right now: the resistance is (predictably) winning, and the pipeline of new antibiotics has nearly run dry.
One data point that should give you pause: NDM — New Delhi metallo-beta-lactamase, a resistance enzyme that makes bacteria nearly impervious to our most powerful class of antibiotics — used to be rare in the U.S., found in just 5.4% of resistant E. coli cases. That number is now 39.3%. It moved from "rare import" to "common problem" in a generation. And it's being driven by factors we're not fully controlling: over-the-counter antibiotics freely available in much of the world, antibiotics prescribed for viral sinusitis, for herniated discs (which are not bacterial infections), for asthmatic children whose flares are almost always viral. Environmental factors — rainfall, temperature — even appear to correlate with resistance rates. Many forces are pushing in the same direction at once.
Modern medicine depends on antibiotics the way a building depends on its foundation
The thing people miss when they think about antibiotic resistance is this: it isn't just about infections. It's about the entire architecture of modern medicine.
A hip replacement, a coronary bypass, an appendectomy — every one of these routine procedures requires antibiotic prophylaxis to prevent infection during and after surgery. When you give a cancer patient chemotherapy, you deliberately suppress their immune system to kill tumors, and then you rely on antibiotics to protect them from infections their body can no longer fight. Organ transplantation requires immune suppression for life. Neonatal intensive care, premature birth management, burn treatment — all of it rests on the assumption that if a bacterial infection arises, it can be beaten.
Remove that calculus, and you lose more than the ability to treat infections. Much of what we call modern civilization depends on a medical system that assumes bacterial infections remain controllable. You lose the ability to do most of modern medicine. You are returned, in the most important functional sense, to the pre-penicillin world — where a simple laceration could mean death and the operations we now perform routinely were the stuff of science fiction.
Market disincentives broke antibiotics before resistance could
The antibiotic pipeline isn't primarily empty because scientists stopped trying. It's empty because of a market dynamic so structurally strange that it's almost elegant in how badly it's constructed.
Every other drug that gets developed follows a simple enough commercial logic: you discover a molecule that treats a disease, get it approved, and sell it. The more patients who need it, the more revenue you generate. That logic completely breaks down for antibiotics.
First, antibiotic courses are short — days to weeks, not lifetime prescriptions. Less time on therapy means less revenue per patient. Second, resistance makes new antibiotics obsolete over time, eroding whatever market you've built. Third — and this is the truly unique part — the pharmaceutical company is actively punished for successful adoption of their drug. The more widely a new antibiotic is used, the faster resistance develops, and the sooner it stops working. So responsible doctors and health systems try to steward the use of the best new antibiotics, reserving them as drugs of last resort. That means the drugs that work best and are most valuable are the ones you sell the fewest of — the exact opposite of every other product in medicine.
These market factors have produced predictable consequences: major antibiotic manufacturers like Melinta and Achaogen have gone bankrupt in recent years. In 2025, there were only 90 antibiotic candidates in development globally — compared to over 2500 in oncology. Companies have simply stopped trying.
The fix exists. It's called the PASTEUR Act. It keeps dying in committee.
The solution to this situation has been identified. It is not complicated in concept, even if it's politically hard to pass.
The logic is simple: decouple how much a pharmaceutical company is paid from how much of their antibiotic is actually used. Instead of revenue tied to volume — which punishes responsible stewardship — the government would pay a subscription fee for access to a portfolio of antibiotics targeting the most dangerous resistant pathogens. Think of it like a Netflix model: you pay for the service regardless of how many episodes you watch. The antibiotic company gets a predictable revenue stream that doesn't collapse just because doctors are correctly reserving their drug for the worst cases.
This is what the PASTEUR Act — the Pioneering Antimicrobial Subscriptions To End Upsurging Resistance Act — is designed to do. It has been introduced, reintroduced, and reintroduced again. First introduced it in 2020, a new version was reintroduced in the Senate on June 24th of this year, with bipartisan co-sponsors.
And there it sits. Again.
The reason this keeps stalling is a separate cultural problem worth naming directly: as a society, we have somehow decided that antibiotics should be cheap. This is a historical accident. Antibiotics were first developed in an era when drug discovery was cheap and drug pricing was in its infancy. That pricing norm got locked in, and it's never been seriously revisited. Nobody protests when we spend $475,000 on a course of CAR-T therapy to treat leukemia. But the moment a new antibiotic carries a price tag that reflects its actual development cost, the political instinct is to accuse the manufacturer of price gouging. Ezekiel Emanuel put it plainly: "As a society, we seem willing to pay $100,000 or more for cancer drugs that cure no one and, at best, add weeks or a few months to life. So why won't we pay $10,000 for a lifesaving antibiotic?"
The answer is cultural, not scientific. And until we fix the culture, the PASTEUR Act will keep getting reintroduced and keep stalling.
The DISARM Act targets the other end of the same problem. Under Medicare's current bundled payment system, hospitals actually lose money when they use newer, more expensive antibiotics — so the financial incentive is to keep reaching for older, cheaper drugs even when resistance has made those drugs less effective. DISARM would carve out a separate reimbursement track for qualifying antibiotics, so hospitals aren't penalized for doing the right clinical thing.
Beyond conventional antibiotics
Even if we pass the PASTEUR and DISARM Acts tomorrow — and we should — conventional antibiotics alone cannot win this war in the long run. The resistance genes are older than civilization. They will always exist somewhere in the environment, waiting to be selected for. An arms race built entirely on finding new versions of existing weapons is a race we can never win outright.
That's why the most exciting work in this space isn't happening in traditional antibiotic discovery. It's happening in adjacent technologies: monoclonal antibodies that target specific bacteria or their toxins without touching the microbiome; bacteriophages — viruses that naturally hunt and kill specific strains of bacteria, deployed therapeutically against infections that no antibiotic can clear; microbiome-based therapies that restructure the bacterial ecosystem in a way that crowds out dangerous pathogens; CRISPR-based tools that could theoretically delete resistance genes from bacteria directly. None of these are fully ready for prime time.
This is the real moonshot. Not finding one more antibiotic that buys us another decade. Building a fundamentally different toolkit that doesn't depend on a chemical arms race we are structurally losing.
What the tabletop exercise taught me
Back to that Washington emergency room. In the scenario, the question that got the sharpest debate wasn't the clinical one — what drug do you try? It was the cascade question: when does an individual patient become a public health emergency? When does a public health emergency become a national security threat?
The answer I kept coming back to: antibiotic resistance is already a national security threat. It threatens far more than individual patients. Modern military medicine depends on effective antibiotics to treat combat wounds, burns, and trauma-related infections. Disaster response systems assume that bacterial infections can be controlled after hurricanes, earthquakes, and mass casualty events. Preparedness plans for biological attacks rely on antibiotics as a core layer of defense. A future in which common pathogens routinely outpace available treatments is not simply a public health problem; it is a direct challenge to national resilience and national security.
It just doesn't look like a national security threat because there's no single outbreak photo, no patient zero tracked across continents, no dramatic escalation moment. It's the slow erosion of the foundation that everything else stands on — surgery, chemotherapy, transplantation, neonatal care — happening in every hospital, in every country, simultaneously, without anyone formally declaring an emergency.
The technology to reverse this trajectory and master this problem exists. The scientific problem is difficult but solvable. The political problem is deciding that it matters.
The legislation to fix the pipeline has been written, rewritten, and introduced. What's missing is the sustained political will to treat this as the crisis it is — not a wonky reimbursement problem to be handled in committee, but the slow-motion unraveling of the medical gains that define the difference between the world we live in and the world that Fleming found when he went to work in the morning.
We have the toolbox. We are choosing not to use it. That is a decision we are making, not a fate being visited upon us.
